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Tariff and non-tariff barriers are widespread as applied to agricultural trade. The theory 
of gains from trade considers the impacts of free trade relative to no trade and to non-
tariff barriers, while the theory of agricultural policy generally places little weight on 
the international trading sector. However, it is necessary to combine agricultural policy 
with the international trading sector so that agricultural policy instruments such as 
price supports are considered together with barriers to trade such as tariffs. This is 
possible within the context of welfare economics when considering the costs and 
benefits of alternative agricultural and trade policies.    
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Introduction 
he discussion of gains from trade goes back at least to Adam Smith (Letiche, 
Chambers, and Schmitz, 1979). A significant body of literature now exists on the 
impact of removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. This literature falls under the heading 
gains from trade. This topic is also taken up in welfare economics, in part because 
gains-from-trade proofs often make use of the concept of economic surplus, that forms 
the basis of modern welfare economics (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 2004). 
Paralleling the discussion on gains from trade is the literature on the welfare 
economics of agricultural policy and its impact on trade. It is possible for policy to 
impact trade even in the absence of tariffs and quotas. 
With the above discussion in mind, there appears to be a great deal of confusion 
over what is meant, at least in empirical modeling, about the economic gains from 
moving to freer trade. For example, does moving to freer trade mean eliminating farm 
programs, or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, or does it mean something 
different? The welfare economics of farm policy contains trade, but trade is only one 
aspect of policy models. 
What is even more confusing is the discussion of the net gains from trade for 
countries in aggregate versus the net gain from trade for a single country. It turns out 
that the welfare impact for an individual country imposing tariffs or price supports can 
be large, but the impact when exporters and importers are considered together is 
relatively small. In welfare models of policy and trade, distributional impacts can be 
significant even though the inefficiency impacts can be small. 
The purpose of this paper is to help clarify the meaning of such terms as gains 
from trade, the welfare impact of agricultural policy, and the interface between trade 
and policy. In the discussion, several models are brought forward that include two 
distortions, such as price supports and import controls coupled with policies that affect 
inputs used to produce outputs. In these cases, the results require a cautious 
interpretation. 
Gains from Trade, Tariffs, and Export Taxes 
The concept of gains from trade is usually discussed in the frame of a comparison 
between free trade and no trade. From a technical standpoint, the gains from free trade 
are measured as areas above excess supply curves and below excess demand curves 
(see the technical annex). In a general equilibrium context, there are losers and gainers 
from trade, but on net, all countries gain from free trade. This general statement 
pervades the economic literature and is the basis for much of the empirical work on 
the impact of freer trade in agriculture. 
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The common trade-distorting instruments, such as tariffs, export taxes, and 
production quotas, can also be discussed within the context of welfare economics. 
Individual countries can gain from such trade instruments, but the gains are less than 
what the trading partners lose. In other words, there are net losses from the use of 
trade instruments. Thus the outcome of trade barriers does not satisfy either the Pareto 
nor the Compensation principle (see the technical annex). 
From a technical standpoint, the optimal welfare tariff is one where the importer 
acts as a monopsonist against an exporter, while in the optimal export tax case the 
exporter acts as a monopolist against an importer. In the case of the optimal revenue 
tariff, the government in the importing country behaves as both a monopsonist and 
monopolist. Also the net welfare costs of these trade instruments are given by 
deadweight loss (DWL) triangles. Of the instruments, the optimal revenue tariff leads 
to the greatest net welfare cost. 
Optimal Byrd Tariff 
In many models of international trade, little emphasis is given to processors and other 
sectors beyond the farm gate. However, under the optimal Byrd tariff, where the tariff 
revenues go to the petitioners for trade litigation, processors play a key role as they 
are often the sector that brings legal action against another country for unfair trade 
practices (Schmitz, Seale, and Schmitz, 2006). Under the Byrd tariff, processors, for 
example, can gain relative to free trade as they have the potential of gaining through 
lower import prices and higher internal prices than would otherwise be the case. 
Under the Byrd Amendment processors can theoretically extract large hidden rents by 
receiving monopolistic and monopsonistic rents. 
There can be large distributional effects from the Byrd tariff, as in the classic tariff 
models, but the net welfare effect for both countries taken together can be small. (The 
welfare effect of price distortions can be significant for an individual country, but the 
net gains from trade, taking into account trading partners, can be relatively small.) 
Like classic tariff models, the Byrd tariff generates net welfare costs that can be 
summarized as a DWL triangle. 
 
 
Trade Elimination and Policy Switching 
One can derive models where, if one takes into account retaliatory action by an 
importer in response to a tariff policy by an exporter, a situation can arise where trade 
ceases. In addition, under retaliatory action, tariffs can give way to production 
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Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   17 
 
impact of production subsidies in a trade context, the policy instrument that gives rise 
to the subsidies can be a tariff. Note that production subsidies are common worldwide, 
including those in China. We hypothesize that many of these subsidies can be a result 
of early tariff protection. 
In a two country model, the gain in absolute size to Country A from retaliation is 
far greater than either the gain or loss to Country B. (The loss may be positive or 
negative depending on price elasticities and the size of the tariff.) There is policy 
switching, and the net improvement from this subsidy is positive. Country A gains 
while Country B loses, but on net (i.e., both countries taken together), there is a net 
welfare gain by Country A from retaliating to Country B’s use of the tariff. 
Production Quotas 
Production quotas have long been used for traded commodities. Two examples include 
the early U.S. production quota programs for peanuts and tobacco. In a seminal paper, 
Paul Johnson (1965) argued that there could be net benefits from the U.S. tobacco 
program because production quotas gave rise to monopolistic prices being charged to 
tobacco importers. In essence, this argument runs counter to results for a closed, no-
trade model where production quotas result in net welfare costs. 
Voluntary export restraints are common in international trade (Bredahl, Schmitz, 
and Hillman, 1987). This type of restraint essentially involves a production quota for 
exporters. In this case, the producers in both the importing and exporting countries 
gain. At the extreme, the voluntary export restraint is equivalent to the optimal export 
tax discussed earlier, but the tax revenue resides with export producers. 
Price Supports and Exports 
When modeling the impact of price supports, one clearly has to incorporate both the 
domestic and trade sectors. It is difficult for one to speak about trade in the absence of 
agricultural policy. Also, it is necessary to include price supports and their impact on 
trade along with input subsidies. These two distortions can lead to both large trade and 
welfare effects. The case of U.S. cotton policy clearly highlights that the impact on 
trade can be significant along with the welfare cost. Furthermore, there can be 
negative gains from trade, a concept often ignored in trade discussions. 
Consider the case where trade takes place in the presence of domestic agricultural 
policy but in the absence of any tariff or non-tariff barriers. The interesting result is 
that, from the exporter’s perspective, the cost of price supports is far greater than the 
net cost for both the exporter and importer taken together. Also, the net effect is a Troy G. Schmitz and Andrew Schmitz 
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DWL triangle, as was the case for trade in the presence of tariffs and export taxes 
discussed earlier. 
Key points: 
•  Price supports result in increased exports. 
•  There are net welfare gains to the exporter from removing the price support, 
but the importer loses. 
•  There are “negative gains” from trade in the sense that the exporter can be 
better off with no trade than with trade under price supports (Schmitz, 
Schmitz, and Dumas, 1997). 
•  Trade can be impacted by domestic farm policy in the absence of tariff or 
non-tariff barriers. 
•  The net welfare cost of exporter price supports for the aggregate of both 
exporters and importers can be far less than the net cost for the exporter from 
the use of price supports. 
Input Subsidies and Price Supports 
The motivation for the theory that combines price supports and water subsidies was 
the Brazilian lawsuit against the United States’ cotton policy. The Brazilians 
contended that the U.S. cotton policy significantly depressed world cotton prices. In 
the technical annex, we show a theoretical model that contains both cotton price 
supports and water subsidies. On the basis of the analysis, we found that the U.S. 
cotton policy depressed world cotton prices by about $0.18 to $0.22 per pound 
(Schmitz et al., 2010). The welfare costs of the U.S. cotton program were empirically 
estimated to be large. The history of the Brazilian lawsuit and the outcome are 
contained in Powell and Schmitz (2005). In the court ruling in favour of Brazil, the 
argument made was that the U.S. cotton policy resulted (according to lawyers) in a 
significant price suppression of world cotton prices (although from an economic 
perspective, it is unclear what percentage drop in price is needed for there to be a 
significant price suppression effect). 
The model in the technical annex focuses on the interaction of input subsidies and 
price supports, which for our purpose include countercyclical payments (CCPs) and 
loan rate payments (LRPs). We analyze these instruments taken together and 
individually, and demonstrate that they operate in a multiplicative rather than an 
additive manner. In this model, the relative magnitude and distribution of the rents 
depend largely on the size of  demand and supply elasticities, the amount of exports, 
and the per unit cost of the water subsidy. For example, the more elastic the supply, 
the greater the DWL triangle; also, the higher the proportion of domestic production Troy G. Schmitz and Andrew Schmitz 
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that is exported, the greater the net cost of the combined subsidies. Using this model 
framework, Schmitz, Schmitz, and Dumas (1997) show theoretically and empirically 
the existence of negative gains from trade for U.S. cotton. 
A combination of the two subsidies distorts output more than when each one acts 
alone, causing the multiplicative effects of the two instruments to be greater than a 
mere summation of the individual effects. Both of these effects increase the size of the 
price support payments made by the government, and in conjunction with price 
supports, the aggregate size of the input subsidy is greater than in the absence of price 
supports. 
Key points: 
•  The combination of price supports and input subsidies can lead to negative 
gains from trade. 
•  There are gainers and losers from domestic policy distortions (e.g., importers 
and domestic producers gain at the expense of domestic taxpayers). 
Supply Management and Border Controls 
Two distortions often exist together, such as import quotas along with production 
controls — the case of Canadian supply management. Here the welfare costs can be 
large or small even though trade may not be restricted as a result of supply 
management. In addition, this type of modeling highlights an element often ignored in 
trade analysis — the impact of trade on sectors beyond the farm gate, such as 
processors. 
The model by Vercammen and Schmitz (1992) considers together import quotas 
and domestic production controls. The impact of supply management depends in part 
on the level of the constraint placed on imports. The tighter the import control, the 
greater will be the welfare cost of supply management. Regardless of the constraint 
placed on imports, the net effect of supply management is given by a DWL triangle. 
An interesting aspect in supply management models is the value attached to 
production quotas. Quota values play a major role in determining compensation to 
producers and landowners if the policy containing production controls as a key 
ingredient is terminated. For example, in the buyout of the U.S. peanut program, 
government compensation to producers and landowners was based largely on peanut 
quota values (Schmitz and Schmitz, 2010a). Quota values would also play a role if, 
for example, supply management–type programs in Canada were eliminated. 
Key point: 
•  Supply management can result in large welfare costs, but it need not cause 
trade distortions. Troy G. Schmitz and Andrew Schmitz 
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Biofuels 
One of the most difficult exercises in empirical welfare economics is conducting a 
benefit-cost analysis of the U.S. corn ethanol program (Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz, 
2007). This is because energy is used to produce corn which, in turn, through 
subsidies, is used to produce energy. Direct production subsidies are not the only 
policy instruments that affect trade. For example, with ethanol production, even in the 
absence of price supports, trade is affected by indirect subsidies to corn producers via 
tax credits to ethanol processors and tariffs on ethanol imports. In this case, corn 
producers win while other groups lose, including livestock producers.  
The study by Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) of the impact of ethanol tax 
credits clearly highlights the need to identify the gain to processors and other sectors 
beyond the farm gate. Also, government policy plays a key role in the analysis. For 
example, net welfare gains increase when one takes into account the impact of ethanol 
production on the lowering of farm subsidies. 
The analysis of production subsidies can be complex and difficult. In the ethanol 
case, one has to consider additional elements that are not easily captured in the corn 
market. One has to account for environmental impacts, the value of distillers grain, 
and the impact on the government payment of a corn farm subsidy. Also, perhaps 
more importantly, general equilibrium effects have to be considered. For example, 
how does ethanol consumption affect the overall fuels market? As we show in Table 1, 
the net welfare gains from providing ethanol tax credits can be positive if ethanol has 
a positive price-depressing effect in the overall fuels market. Du and Hayes (2008) 
argue, for example, that the impact of ethanol on the fuels market can be quite large 
(between $0.29 and $0.40 per gallon). Along the same lines, Zilberman et al. (2011) 
contend that fuel prices are impacted partly because the OPEC strategy of production 
controls is related to the U.S. ethanol policy. The debate over ethanol subsidies 
continues. Many of the components of an ethanol corn model, such as whether or not 
the price impact on the overall fuels market is significant, are open to debate. 
Trade becomes an integral part of biofuels policy. First, there are exports and 
imports of ethanol. Second, trade is created from one of the ethanol byproducts, 
namely distillers grain (DG). Since 2002, U.S. ethanol production has increased by an 
average of 26 percent per year, reaching nine billion gallons in 2008. As a byproduct 
of dry-mill ethanol production, distillers grain production also increased rapidly, 
reaching approximately 20 million metric tons (million tonnes) in 2008 (Fox, 2009). 
From 1995 to 2004, U.S. exports of DG averaged about 740,000 tonnes, ranging 
from 526,000 tonnes in 1996 to 842,000 tonnes in 2002 (Figure 1). Mexico and 
Canada accounted for approximately 43 percent of DG exports by the United States in Troy G. Schmitz and Andrew Schmitz 
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2007 and 2008. Canadian imports peaked in 2008 at roughly 800,000 tonnes, but fell 
to 600,000 in 2009 (Figure 2). 
 
Table 1  U.S. Ethanol and the Broader Fuels Market 
  Supply elasticities (corn) 
 0.4 0.5  0.6 0.7
  Shift based on 2006 market conditions 
Gasoline market price ($/gallon) 2.969 2.969  2.969 2.969
Gasoline market quantity (billion gallons)  139.726 139.730  139.733 139.733
Gain in consumer surplus (billion dollars)  4.369 4.390  4.411 4.411
Loss to gasoline/oil producers (billion dollars)  –4.358 –4.378  –4.399 –4.399
  Loss to foreign producers (billion dollars)  –3.042 –3.057  –3.071 –3.071
  Loss to domestic producers (billion 
dollars) 
–1.307 –1.314 –1.320 –1.320
Gain to ethanol producers (billion dollars)  0.046 0.046  0.046 0.046
Net welfare gain (billion dollars)  3.107 3.122  3.138 3.138
  2.0 billion bushel shift in demand 
Gasoline market price ($/gallon) 2.961 2.961  2.961 2.961
Gasoline market quantity (billion gallons)  139.897 139.904  139.907 139.907
Gain in consumer surplus (billion dollars)  5.397 5.439  5.460 5.460
Loss to gasoline/oil producers (billion dollars)  –5.379 –5.421  –5.442 –5.442
  Loss to foreign producers (billion dollars)  –3.753 –3.782  –3.797 –3.797
  Loss to domestic producers (billion 
dollars) 
–1.614 –1.626 –1.633 –1.633
Gain to ethanol producers (billion dollars)  0.069 0.070  0.071 0.071
Net welfare gain (billion dollars)  3.852 3.883  3.898 3.898
Source: Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) 
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Figure 2  U.S. exports of DG to Canada and Mexico. 
 
*Projected based on Jan-May 
Source:USDA-FAS http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/USTExHS10.aso?0/= 
*Projected based on Jan-May 
Source:USDA-FAS http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/USTExHS10.aso?0I= Troy G. Schmitz and Andrew Schmitz 
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Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates the interconnection between trade policy and agricultural 
policy. Because of the significant role played by agricultural policy, its impact cannot 
be discussed without being placed in a trade context. Agricultural policy can impact 
agricultural trade in the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Likewise, trade policy 
can impact agriculture even if agricultural policy instruments are absent. However, 
both are important and have to be modeled together, and the results should be 
discussed in the context of welfare economics, where gainers and losers and welfare 
net impacts are identified. 
Empirically, the importance of combined trade and policy instruments depends in 
part on the time period covered by the analysis. For example, throughout much of the 
history of U.S. policy, the impact was significant, because U.S. farm policy 
established target prices for major commodities that were well above market prices. 
However, as of early 2011, market prices were significantly above target prices (Table 
2). For example, cotton and corn prices were more than double the target prices set in 
the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill. Also, higher commodity prices give rise to importers 
lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers (Schmitz and Schmitz, 2010b). As a result, the 
impacts of farm policy (in conjunction with tariff and non-tariff barriers) are highly 
dependent on the extent to which time periods are included where target prices are 
binding. 
 
Table 2  U.S. Target Prices and Futures for Selected U.S. Commodities 
  Target price  Futures  
[March 1, 2011] 
 (dollars)  (dollars) 
Corn (dollars/bushel)  2.63  7.29 




Soybeans (dollars/bushel)  5.80  13.61 
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